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INTRODUCTION

Like most Americans, Alexander Jordan liked living in America. He
especially enjoyed the outdoors and often went camping, target shooting, or
to barbeques.' Like most Americans, Alexander Jordan was also deeply
affected by the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in New York City
and Washington D.C. 2 In fact, the attacks prompted Jordan to join the Army
in order to help protect his country against future attacks. 3 In September of
2003, Jordan enlisted in the Army and in the following January he was assigned to Fort Richardson Army post in Alaska.4 Jordan planned on serving
his country in the Army and then becoming a police officer and starting a

1. Obituaries,ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 27, 2006, at B9.
2.
Id.
3.
Id.
4. Ex-Cibola Student Killed in Iraq: Mother Says 9/11 Was One Reason Her Son
Joined the Arny, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 16, 2006, at El.
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family of his own.5 He was never given that chance. On September 10,
2006, while deployed to Iraq, Corporal Jordan's unit came under smallarms fire from insurgents and he was shot and killed.6 Corporal Alexander
Jordan was thirty-one years old.7
Corporal Andrew Kemple also joined the Army in 2003, just two years
after graduating from high school. 8 On February 12, 2006, while deployed
to Iraq, Corporal Kemple and his unit went on a mission to search for a
hidden weapons cache and his Humvee came under attack from insurgents. 9
Corporal Kemple was killed during the attack.' ° Minnesota Governor Tim
Pawlenty described Corporal Kemple as "a devoted soldier who loved serving his country and did so with12 great pride."" Corporal Andrew Kemple
was just twenty-three years old.
Sergeant Joshua Youmans also died from injuries he sustained while
serving his country in Iraq.' 3 On November 21, 2005, Sergeant Youmans
was wounded when an Improvised Explosive Device, commonly referred to
as an IED, exploded near his vehicle. 14 In addition to injuring Sergeant
Youmans, the devastating blast killed one man instantly and badly burned
three others.'5 While Sergeant Youmans was trying to recover at Brooks
Army Medical Center in San Antonio Texas,' 6 he had the opportunity to
hold his daughter, McKenzie, for the first time. 17 On March 1, 2006, a week
after meeting his daughter, Sergeant Youmans died from his injuries. 18 Sergeant Joshua Youmans was twenty-six years old.' 9
These three individuals have much in common. Not only are they
members of a long list of men and women who have sacrificed their lives in
5.
Obituaries, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Sept. 27, 2006, at B9.
6.
Ex-Cibola Student Killed in Iraq; Mother Says 9/11 Was One Reason Her Son
Joined the Army, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 16, 2006, at El.
7.
Id.
8.
Ben Cohen, Services Set for Minnesotan Killed in Iraq, STAR TRIB., Feb. 21,
2006, at 7B.
9.
Id.
10.
Id.

11.
Gov. Pawlenty Orders U.S., State Flags at Half-Staff in Honor of Cpl. Kemple,
US STATES NEWS, Feb. 22, 2006.

12.
Ben Cohen, Services Set for Minnesotan Killed in Iraq, STAR TRIB., Feb. 21,
2006, at 7B.
Patrick O'Connor, Rogers Bill Would Ban Protests at Funerals,THE HILL, Mar.
13.
15, 2006, at 4.
14.
Mich. Soldier Wounded in Iraq Dies, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at 18.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
152 CONG. REC. H2199, 2201 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
18.
152 CONG. REc. H3208, 3210 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
19.
Mich. Soldier Wounded in Iraq Dies, LANSING ST. J., Mar. 4, 2006, at 18.
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service to the United States of America, but they are also members of an
alarmingly growing list of service members whose funerals were protested
in an offensive and disrespectful manner. At Corporal Jordan's funeral,
protesters held up signs that read "THANK GOD FOR DEAD SOLDIERS"
and "GOD HATES FAGS. 2 ° Similar activity took place at Corporal Kernpie's funeral in Minnesota where protesters chanted "GOD HATES
AMERICA" and "GOD LOVES IEDs.",21 However, in addition to these
chants, the protesters also confronted Corporal Kemple's mother and
"taunted" her as she entered the church to say goodbye to her son.2 2 The
same disturbing chants were directed at Sergeant Youmans' wife as she
entered the church where her husband's memorial took place.23 United
States Congressional Representative Mike Rogers of Michigan attended the
service and described the "chants
and... taunting as some of the most vile
24
things [he] had ever heard.,
Unfortunately, these three stories are not unique. Protesters have been
disrupting and dishonoring service member funerals all over the United
States since June of 2005.25 In Indiana, the mother of Sergeant Ricky Jones
received multiple phone calls stating: "I am glad your son is dead," "He
deserved to die," and "I'm glad your son is coming home in a body bag. 2 6
Someone also threw eggs 27
at Mrs. Jones' home and put trash all over her
front yard during the night. In Kansas, protesters showed up
28at the funeral
of Sergeant Donald Hasse carrying their trademark signs. The question
most Americans have is why? Who would preach hate to the family members of soldiers who gave their lives protecting their country?
A.

THE WESTBORO BAPTIST CHURCH

The people responsible for these disturbing protests are members of
the Westboro Baptist Church. The Westboro Baptist Church is based in
20.

Jim Belshaw, Protesters an Insult to Free Speech, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 22,

25.

A Ministry of Hate, THE REcoRD, June 10, 2006, § Faith, at 8.

2006, at B 1.
21.
152 CONG. REC. H2199, 2203 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
22.
152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2203 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Gutknecht).
23.
152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2201 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Rogers).
24.
Id.
26.
Buyer).
27.
28.
Tiahrt).

152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.

Id.
152 CONG. Rc. H2199, 2205 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
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Topeka, Kansas and is led by 76 year-old pastor Fred Phelps. 29 The church
is not very large in number, with only about 75 members, but it has been
engaged in a campaign that has had a deleterious effect on millions of
American citizens. 30 The basic message promoted by the Westboro Baptist
Church is that God hates homosexuals and America's tolerance of homosexual conduct has lead to various acts of punishment from God including
Hurricane Katrina, the death of soldiers in Iraq, the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and many other natural disasters. 31 The group first gained
notoriety in 1998 when several church members protested at the funeral of
Matthew Shepard, a University of Wyoming student who had been brutally
murdered because of his homosexual preference.32 At his funeral, members
of the Westboro Baptist Church held up signs that read "GOD HATES
FAGS" and chanted "FAGS DIE, GOD LAUGHS. 33
In June of 2005, members of the Westboro Baptist Church began protesting at funerals of American troops who were killed in combat. 34 However, the link between the Church's message and these dead soldiers is not
entirely clear. 35 According to a senior correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, the protesters are not protesting the individual sexual preference of the
dead soldier, they are not protesting the military's "don't ask, don't tell"
policy concerning homosexuality, and they are not even protesting the estimated three percent of military members who are homosexuals.3 6 Instead,
29.
See A Ministry of Hate, THE RECORD, June 10, 2006, § Faith, at 8.
30.
See id.
31.
A Ministry of Hate, THE RECORD, June 10, 2006, § Faith, at 8. The protestors
also recently picketed the funerals of some of the students who were killed in the violent
shooting spree at Northern Illinois University on February 14, 2008. Jameel Naqvi, Small
Group of Protestors Fail to DisruptFuneralServices, DAiLY HERALD, Feb. 19, 2008, available at http://www.dailyherald.com/story/?id=137589. Protestors at Ryanne Mace's funeral
held up signs that read "God Sent the Shooter." Id. Paulette Phelps, one of the protestors at
the funeral, spent about a thousand dollars on a flight to Chicago and justified the expense
saying, "'When this is what you do as your hobby, as your leisure time, this is what you
spend your money on... This is our vacation. This is our fun time."' Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
See Howard Witt, Lawmakers Rush to Blunt Anti-gay Church, Virulent Protests
at FuneralsRaise the Question: Is There a Limit to Il'
Amendment Protections?,CHI. TRm.,
Apr. 4, 2006, Zone C, at I (claiming the protests have nothing to do with the military's
"don't ask, don't tell" policy concerning tolerance of homosexuality). But see Nyier Abdou,
When Duty Calls, These Riders Hit the Road, THE STAR-LEDGER, Jan. 15, 2006, § New
Jersey, at 19 (stating that the Westboro Baptist Church believes part of God's punishment is
a direct result of the military's tolerance of homosexuality through its "don't ask, don't tell"
policy).
36.
Howard Witt, Lawmakers Rush to Blunt Anti-gay Church, Virulent Protests at
FuneralsRaise The Question: Is There a Limit to 1s! Amendment Protections?,CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 4, 2006, Zone C, at 1.
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the Westboro Baptist Church claims that these soldiers are "guilty by association. 37 When asked why his group was protesting at military funerals,
Phelps said "'You connect the dots' . . . 'This evil nation has taught from
the cradle to the grave that it's OK to be gay. Now God is over in Iraq
picking off America's kids. They turned America over to fags, now they
are coming home in body bags."' 38 The group claims that it has protested at
over 200 military funerals across the nation 39 and over 34,000 total demonstrations. 4° The protester's activities have generally been limited to displaying signs and shouting during funerals, but in some cases there have been
reports of violence between protesters and funeral attendees. 4'
B.

CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE

In response to these protests, Congress passed The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act on May 29, 2006 (hereinafter "Act").42 The Act
places specific limitations on protests at any cemetery controlled by the
National Cemetery Administration or at Arlington National Cemetery.4 3
First, the Act prohibits all demonstrations on cemetery land unless "the
demonstration has been approved by the cemetery superintendent or the
director of the property on which the cemetery is located." 44 This is essentially a congressional codification of Veterans Administration regulations
already in place.45 Second, the Act restricts demonstrations that occur
within sixty minutes prior to a funeral and sixty minutes immediately following a funeral if: 1) the demonstration "takes place within 150 feet of a
road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress from such cemetery
37.
Id.
38.
Id. The Group had even planned on protesting at the funerals of five Amish
girls who were murdered in their Pennsylvania schoolhouse and only abandoned those plans
when a radio talk show host offered to give them fifty five minutes of air-time in exchange
for a promise not to disrupt the funerals. Jacques Steinberg, Air Time Instead of Funeral
Protest,N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at A14.
Asked
Questions,
Baptist
Church
Frequently
39.
Westboro
http://www.westborobaptistchurch.com/faq.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2008).
Westboro Baptist Church Home Page, http://www.godhatesfags.com/ (last
40.
visited Mar. 8, 2008).
See Rozanna M. Martinez, Soldier's FuneralProtested: Tempers Flare Outside
41.
Cemetery, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 22, 2006, at Al.

42.
38 U.S.C § 2413 (2006).
43.
Id. However, on December 22, 2006, President Bush signed into law the Respect for the Funerals of Fallen Heroes Act which expands the coverage of the Respect for
America's Fallen Heroes Act to include any funeral of a member (or former member) of the
armed forces, even if the funeral takes place on land not controlled by the National Cemetery
Administration. See 18 U.S.C § 1388 (2006).
44.
38 U.S.C § 2413 (2006).
45.
See 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006) (delegating the authority to manage federal cemeteries to the Veterans Administration).
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property" and "includes, as part of such demonstration, any individual willfully making or assisting in the making of any noise or diversion that disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral, memorial
service, or ceremony;" or 2) "is within 300 feet of such cemetery and impedes the access to or egress from such cemetery. ,,46 The Act goes on to
describe the definition of demonstration to mean: 1) "Any picketing or
similar conduct;" 2) "Any oration, speech, use of sound amplification
equipment or device, or similar conduct that is not part of a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony;" 3) "The display of any placard, banner, flag, or
similar device, unless such a display is part of a funeral, memorial service,
or ceremony;" and (4) "The distribution of any handbill, pamphlet, leaflet,
or other written or printed matter other than47a program distributed as part of
a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony.,
The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act received virtually
unanimous bipartisan support in the House of Representatives with an official vote of 403 in favor and 3 opposed.4 8 After passing in the House of
Representatives, the bill went to the Senate where members of the Senate
proposed an amendment to tighten the distance restriction in an effort to
make the Act more narrowly tailored.49 In fact, the Senate amendment to
tighten the restriction is one example of an underlying theme throughout the
legislative history of this Act: to make sure the Act withstands constitutional scrutiny. 50 The Senate floor debate acknowledged that special sensitivity is required any time the federal government seeks to expand "zones of
Federal influence or regulation, especially to cover lands that are not its
own."5 1 While most Americans probably disagree with what the members
of the Westboro Baptist Church are doing, many feel that they have a constitutional right to do so and that for Congress to legislate against their protest activities creates a dangerous precedent for future free speech restric-

46.

38 U.S.C § 2413 (2006).

47.
Id.
48.
152 CONG. REc. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Mr. Craig).
49.
The original proposal in the House of Representatives restricted demonstrations
within 500 feet of cemetery property. The Senate Amendment removed the blanket 500-foot
restriction and replaced it with the current languagc of restricting protests within 150 feet of
an ingress or egress area or within 300 feet of the cemetery if it impedes ingress or egress to
the cemetery. 152 CONG. REc. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Mr. Craig).
50.
The stated purpose of the Senate amendment was to try to avoid an overinclusive challenge. 152 CONG. REc. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Mr.
Craig). Additionally, a significant part of the Congressional Record is dedicated to expert
testimony from David Forte, a law professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, on the
constitutionality of the Act. See 152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2205-07 (daily ed. May 9, 2006)
(statement of Professor David Forte).
51.
152 CONG. REc. S5129 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Mr. Craig).
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tions. 52 I believe this federal statute will be challenged as a facially unconstitutional restriction on free speech, in part because at least three of the
comparable state statutes have already been challenged 53 and in part because a Westboro Baptist Church spokesperson has stated the church
"'would challenge anything it considers restrictive.' ' 54 This comment will
analyze the facial constitutionality of the protest limitation provisions of
The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act under the First Amendment's
free speech clause and will argue that it is a valid time, place, and manner
restriction on free speech because it is content-neutral and is narrowly tailored to advance a significant governmental interest while leaving open
ample alternative means of communication. This comment will briefly discuss some of the issues that individual states will have in drafting similar
legislation and attempt to provide an analytical framework for drafting state
legislation that will withstand constitutional scrutiny.
II.

BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT FREE SPEECH

LAW

The First Amendment is arguably one of the most revered aspects of
American jurisprudence because it embodies the concepts of freedom upon
which the United States was founded. 55 The First Amendment states "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble., 56 The expressed
constitutional right to free speech has been deemed necessary to promote
the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate implicit in a democratic
nation.57 This language appears plain and straightforward but has generated
countless volumes of case-law interpreting its meaning. The most important
conclusion to be drawn from these many legal decisions is that the rights
granted to citizens of the United States and of the individual states concerning freedom of speech, while fundamental, are not absolute.58
52.
See, e.g., Larry Dale Keeling, Don't Appeal Ruling on Funeral Protests,
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Oct. 1, 2006, at D1; Yes to Phelps, No to Bush, THE

ADVOCATE, July 4, 2006, at 5.
53.
See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Dave

McKinney, Did Anti-gay Church Have Rights Violated?: FuneralProtest Law Could Face

ACLU Challenge, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 3.
54.
Frank E. Lockwood, Radical Sect Plans Protest at Service, LEXINGTON
HERALD-LEADER, Aug. 9, 2006, at Al.
55.
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418 (1989); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15, 24 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
56.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
57.
N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 270.
58.
E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 430 (1989); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1, 4 (1949); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Whitney v.
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One of the most famous examples of unprotected speech came from
former Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes who claimed that
falsely yelling fire in a crowded theatre would never receive First Amendment protection. 59 Similarly, fighting words, defined as "words likely to
60
cause an average addressee to fight," are not constitutionally protected.
Additionally, advocating illegal action is unprotected if it falls under the
6
modem clear and present danger test announced in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 1
Furthermore, speech that falls into the categories of either obscenity or
defamation is also not entitled to constitutional protection.6 2 Apart from
these discrete classes of unprotected speech, the Supreme Court has also
found reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech rights
to be valid.63 So while the language of the Constitution states that Congress
shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, clearly something other
than a literal application of this language is required.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In general, the first step in any constitutional analysis is to determine
the appropriate standard of review. 64 Since First Amendment rights relating
to free speech are deemed fundamental,6 5 the initial reaction is to apply
strict scrutiny to any governmental action that restricts or denies those
rights. 66 However, not all free speech cases require strict scrutiny. 67 Two
important factors must be analyzed together in order to determine the appropriate standard of review. The first factor is the type of forum to which
the restriction is applicable and the second factor relates to whether the re-

California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
59.
Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.
60.
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573.
61.
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1968).
62.
E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 15 (1973); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572-73.
63.
E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 725 (2000); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474, 488 (1998); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 789-90 (1989); Clark v.
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984).
64.
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 506 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
65.
W. Va. St. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
66.
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
67.
See generally Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (applying intermediate
scrutiny to a state statute restricting limiting speech within 100 feet of an entrance to a medical facility); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1998) (applying intermediate scrutiny to a
statute limiting residential picketing).
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striction distinguishes permitted speech from prohibited speech based on
the content of the speech.68
The Court has recognized three forum classes for First Amendment
purposes. 69 The first is the traditional public forum, the clearest example of
which is usually considered to be public streets, parks, and sidewalks.7 ° In
this traditional public forum, any content-based restriction on free speech
must pass strict constitutional scrutiny by being narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest. 7' The second type of forum is
the government created public forum whereby the government has opened
up an otherwise non-public forum to public debate. 72 In this governmentcreated public forum, strict scrutiny also applies to any content-based restriction and such restrictions will have to be narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.7 3 The only practical difference between
the government created public forum and the traditional public forum is that
the government is not required to indefinitely maintain the forum as open
for public debate and could turn such a forum into a non-public forum by
closing it to all public debate. 74 The final public forum category is the nonpublic forum. 75 In a non-public forum, content-based restrictions do not
trigger strict scrutiny as long as the restrictions reasonably relate to the intended purpose of the forum and do not go beyond content-based restrictions to viewpoint-based restrictions. 76 Essentially, content-based restrictions require strict scrutiny in both the traditional public forum and the government created public forum but do not require strict scrutiny, at least
to
77
the extent that they are not viewpoint-based, in the non-public forum.

68.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 479-81.
69.
Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1983).
70.
E.g., id. at 44-45; Frisby,487 U.S. at 480.
71.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
72.
Perry Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 45.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76.
Id. Viewpoint-based discrimination occurs where the government seeks to
suppress the speaker's view on a particular subject. Id. at 46. For example, in Texas v.
Johnson, the Court concluded that a Texas state statute that prohibited burning the United
States flag in such a way as to offend one or more persons was viewpoint-based because it
promoted one side of a debate: whether the flag should be honored as a symbol of national
unity. 491 U.S. 397, 413 n.9 (1989). This viewpoint-based discrimination is distinguishable
from content-based discrimination in that it does more than discriminate based upon a particular topic by advocating one side of the argument related to a particular topic. See Perry
Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 46.
77.
See Perry Educ. Assn., 460 U.S. at 44-46.
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In the traditional public forum and the government-created public forum, a different analysis applies if the restriction is content-neutral.7 8 If the
restriction is content-neutral, an intermediate level of scrutiny applies and
the restriction is deemed constitutional if it is "narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest" and "leave[s] open ample alternative channels of communication. ' 79 These types of restrictions are commonly called
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions and do not require strict
scrutiny because of the recognized principle that free speech rights, even in
the most public of places, are not absolute.8 °
The content-based versus content-neutral distinction is one of the most
important aspects of any free speech analysis because in most cases it dictates the standard of review. 81 The content-based versus content-neutral
distinction is one of the most important aspects of any free speech analysis
because in most cases it dictates the standard of review. 82 As in other constitutional challenges, meeting the high standard of strict scrutiny places a
heavy burden on the government to justify a restriction, and the government
will often not meet this standard. 83 For example, the Supreme Court has
held anti-picketing statutes with specific exceptions for labor dispute picketing to be content-based and unconstitutional. 84 In Police Dep't of Chicago
v. Mosley, the Court reasoned that allowing an exception for labor picketing
in an anti-picketing ordinance was a content-based restriction because the
"ordinance itself describes impermissible picketing not in terms of time,
place, and manner, but in terms of subject matter., 8 5 In Boos v. Barry, the
Court also found an impermissible content-based restriction when a District
of Columbia statute prohibited certain expressive conduct within 500 feet of
a foreign embassy if the expressive conduct tended to bring that foreign
government into "public disrepute. 8 6 The Court reasoned that while the
78.
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1998); Grayned v. City of Rockford,
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
79.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 482 (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'
Assn., 460 U.S. 37,44-46 (1983)).
80.
See Frisby, 487 U.S. 474.
81.
See Eric C. Chaffee, Sailing Toward Safe Harbor Hours: The Constitutionality
of Regulating Television Violence, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 12 (2005).
82.
See Eric C. Chaffee, Sailing Toward Safe Harbor Hours: The Constitutionality
of Regulating Television Violence, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1, 13 (2005).
83.
See generally Christina E. Wells, Fearand Loathing in ConstitutionalDecisionMaking, 2005 Wis. L. REv. 115, 209 (2005) (reasoning that "the application of strict scrutiny means that the Court likely will strike down a restriction on speech").
84.
Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972).
85.
Id. at 99. In Mosley, the city of Chicago prohibited "Pickets or demonstrations
on a public way within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school building while the
school is in session.., provided, that this subsection does not prohibit the peaceful picketing
of any school involved in a labor dispute." Id. at 92-93.
86.
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 312 (1988).
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secondary effects of expressive conduct can be the basis for a contentneutral restriction, "regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on
its audience" are content-based because the "emotive impact of speech on
its audience is not a 'secondary effect.' '87 On the other hand, the Court has
determined that numerous anti-picketing statutes aimed at abortion protesters are not content-based.88 In Hill v. Colorado, the Court reasoned that a
Colorado statute prohibiting certain demonstrations within 100 feet of a
health care facility 89 was content-neutral because it applied equally to all
potential protesters and made no reference to the content of the prohibited
speech.90 Generally, if a restriction makes no facial distinction with regard
to the topic of the prohibited speech, the restriction will be considered content-neutral. 91
B.

TIME, PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS

If a statute applies in either a traditional public forum or a government
created public forum and is found to be content-based, then it may only be
justified if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling government interest.92 However, if a statute is found to be content-neutral then it is justified if it is narrowly tailored to advance a significant government interest
while also leaving open ample channels for communication. 93 It is not very
difficult to find a significant government interest that would satisfy a time,
place, or manner restriction. Traditional police powers such as protecting
the health and safety of citizens, 94 reducing crime,95 protecting citizens from
intrusive noise,96 and promoting the orderly flow of traffic on streets and
sidewalks 97 have all been recognized as significant governmental interests.
Another interesting factor that the Court- seems to take into account
when determining whether a significant state interest is at stake concerns
whether the speech is directed at a captive audience or significantly interferes with a privacy interest. 98 The Court has made it clear that in many
87.
Id. at 321.
88, E.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr.
Inc., 51,2 U.S. 753 (1994).
80.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 707.
90.
Id. at 719.
91.
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976).
92.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
93.
Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
94.
Hill, 530 U.S. at 715, 725.
95.
City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 435 (2002).
96.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
97.
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr. Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994).
98.
See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); Consol. Edison Co. of
N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 541-42 (1980).
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situations it expects "individuals simply to avoid speech they do not want to
hear;" 99 however, when a substantial privacy interest is invaded in an intolerable manner, the state may legitimately restrict speech on a captive audience theory. 1' ° For example, the Court in Frisby v. Schultz concluded that
protecting unwilling listeners inside their home is a significant government
interest.' 0 1 The Court stated, "[t]here simply is no right to force speech into
the home of an unwilling listener."' 10 2 The Court reasoned that subjecting
individuals to unwelcome speech in their own home implicates the captive
audience theory because listeners are left "with no ready means of avoiding
the unwanted speech.' '0 3 However, under the captive audience doctrine, a
must still
regulation designed to restrict speech aimed at a captive1audience
4
be narrowly tailored to advance that significant interest.'
While the narrowly-tailored requirement in a time, place, and manner
restriction might be harder to demonstrate than the significant interest, it 10is5
not the same narrowly-tailored analysis that applies under strict scrutiny.
In order to be narrowly tailored under a time, place, and manner analysis, a
regulation does not have to be the least restrictive means available, as is the
standard under a strict scrutiny analysis; rather, the regulation would be
narrowly tailored if the substantial government interest would be achieved
less effectively absent the restriction.1°6 In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
the Court reasoned that a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction
is narrowly tailored if the "means chosen are not substantially broader than
necessary to achieve the government's interest."' 7 In Ward, the Court concluded that a statute requiring a city sound technician to control the soundboard during musical performances at a city park directly served the city's
significant interest in noise control. 0 8 The Court further reasoned that the
statute was narrowly tailored because the city's interest would have been
1°9 It was of no consequence
achieved
effectively
absent the
that
other less
methods
of controlling
therestriction.
sound may have
existed, even if those

99.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484. See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (finding that individuals using a city's public transportation were a captive audience and therefore the city could limit advertisements in public transportation to less controversial types of advertisements).
100.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
101.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488.
102.
Id. at 485.
103.
Id. at 487.
104.
Id. at 485.
105.
See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n.6 (1989); United
States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
106.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 n.6, 799.
107.
Id. at 800.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
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other methods may have been less restrictive on free speech. 10 Further, in
United States v. Albertini, the Court stated that "[t]he validity of [time,
place, or manner] restrictions does not turn on a judge's agreement with the
responsible decisionmaker concerning the most appropriate method for
promoting significant government interests.""'
The final part of the time, place, and manner analysis concerns
whether the restriction leaves open ample alternatives for the speech. In
order to demonstrate that a restriction does not leave open ample alternatives for the speech, there must be a showing that other avenues for the
speech are inadequate. 12 This part of the analysis addresses the degree to
which the statute is narrowly tailored because while the restriction does not
need to be the least restrictive means, it must leave open other viable means
of communication. 1 3 In Frisby, the Court said that a restriction on residential picketing left open ample channels of communication because protesters were still able to enter neighborhoods, go door-to-door promoting their
views, distribute literature through the mail, and contact people by phone so
long as it did not amount to harassment. 14 The Court reasoned that due to
the statute's limited application, the availability of alternative channels of
communication was self-evident." 5 Similarly, the Court in Perry Educ.
Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn. held that a restriction on the use of a
school district's internal mail system left open ample alternative channels
for communication 6in part because the United States' mail system was a
viable alternative." 1
Ill.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESPECT FOR AMERICA'S FALLEN HEROES ACT

Turning to the constitutionality of the free speech restrictions in The
Respect for America's Fallen Hero's Act, the first step is to determine the
appropriate standard of review.

110.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985).
Ward, 491 U.S. at 802.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483-84 (1988).

115.
116.

Id. at 483.

114.

Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.

Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 53 (1983).
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To determine the standard of review, it is important to consider the
18
type of forum to which the Act applies."7 The first paragraph of the Act
codifies current Veterans Administration regulations" 19 that require prior
approval by the cemetery superintendent in order to conduct any
demonstration on cemetery property under the control of the National
Cemetery Administration or on Arlington National Cemetery property. 20
This paragraph only applies to the actual cemetery property, not to the
public sidewalks or streets surrounding the cemetery, 121 and cemetery
property is considered to be a non-public forum for free speech purposes.1
However, the Act's application goes beyond the actual cemetery property
because it also places certain restrictions on demonstrations that take place
"within 150 feet of a road, pathway, or other route of ingress to or egress
from" cemetery property. 23 Further, the Act places restrictions on speech
24
within 300 feet of the cemetery if it impedes access to the cemetery.1
These two provisions of the Act clearly extend into the traditional public
forum because they would restrict speech
on the public sidewalks and
25
property.
cemetery
surrounding
streets
2.

Content-Basedor Content-NeutralAnalysis

The second aspect of determining the appropriate standard of review
relates to whether the Act is a content-neutral or content-based restriction.
Since the Act applies in the traditional public forum, a content-based re117.
The standard of review is dependent upon the type of forum being regulated.
See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act clearly places restrictions on speech activity and this
comment assumes the restricted speech at issue is protected under the ls Amendment and
subject to constitutional review.
118.
The first paragraph of the Act states that no person may carry out "a demonstration on the property of a cemetery under the control of the National Cemetery Administration or on the property of Arlington National Cemetery unless the demonstration has been
approved by the cemetery superintendent or the director of the property on which the cemetery is located." 38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(1) (2006).
119.
See 38 C.F.R. § 1.218 (2006).
120.
38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(1) (2006).
121.
Id.
122.
Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
123.
38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
124.
38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(2)(B) (2006).
125.

(1983).

See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 45
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striction will have to meet strict scrutiny, while a content-neutral restriction
will be subject to the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard through a
reasonable time, place, and manner analysis.126 In determining whether this
Act restricts speech based on its content there are two possibilities that must
be considered. The first .is to look at the Act on its face to determine
whether the language itself differentiates permissible speech from prohibited speech on the basis of content.127 The second is to look at the purpose
behind the restriction to see if the Act, while neutral on its face, might still
be considered 28
a content-based restriction because of the motivation behind
its enactment.1
a.

StatutoryLanguage on its Face

The legislative history of this Act makes it clear that Congress drafted
The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act in a very careful manner with
the goal of avoiding constitutional infirmities. 129 Congress was careful to
choose language that had been upheld in previous Supreme Court decisions
as being content-neutral and therefore the Act tends to appear neutral on its
face. 130 For example, the Act does not describe prohibited speech in terms
of its message but rather prohibits speech that has not been "approved by
the cemetery superintendent or the director," speech that is "not part of a
funeral, memorial service, or ceremony," and speech that "disturbs or tends
to disturb the peace or good order of the funeral, memorial service, or
ceremony."' 3 1
Examining the plain language of the Act, it does not restrict speech on
the basis of content. The language requiring prior approval for speech on
cemetery property (properly categorized as a non-public forum) does bring
into question the doctrine of prior restraint 32 and does not reference the
content of the speech. 133 Nothing in this language specifically requires the
126.
See supra notes 69-80 and accompanying text.
127.
See generally Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
128.
See infra notes 155-59 and accompanying text.
129.
See supra note 50.
130.
See e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972).
131.
38 U.S.C § 2413 (2006).
132.
This comment will not address the doctrine of prior restraint. However, In
Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the United States Court

of Appeals for the Federal Circuit determined that the discretion granted to the Veterans
Administration is "reasonable in light of the characteristic nature and function of national
cemeteries." Id. at 1325.
133.
See 38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(1) (2006). Even if this language did reference the content of prohibited speech, strict scrutiny would only apply if the reference could also be
considered viewpoint-based because this part of the statute only applies in the non-public
forum. See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
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appropriate official to grant or deny approval for certain types or subjects of
speech. 134 Similarly, the language that restricts speech unless it is "part of a
funeral, memorial service, or ceremony" does not reference the content of
the speech, so if the speech is part of the official ceremony there would be
no restriction on the speech, regardless of its content.' 35 Conversely, if the
speech is not part of the official ceremony and the speech falls under the
specific time and distance restrictions, it would be prohibited regardless of
the content of the speech. For example, some commentators have suggested
that the Act is content-based because it would allow the Patriot Guard Riders to attend these funerals, wave American flags, and stand between protestors and family members. 136 These commentators are only correct if the
Patriot Guard Riders have not been given permission to be there as part of
the funeral, memorial service, or ceremony. 37 Since the Patriot Guard Riders only attend funerals to which they have been invited, 138 they would be
part of the funeral, ceremony, or service and are not restricted in any way
by the Act. However, the Act would prohibit uninvited riders from demonstrating at a funeral.1 39 It is the invitation to attend the funeral, not the fact

that their speech is patriotic, that allows their speech to take place without
limitation. The language "part of a funeral, memorial service, or ceremony"
does not require the appropriate official to look at the content of the speech
to know whether it is permissible or impermissible because a determination40
as to whether the speech is part of the official service is dispositive.1
Therefore, the language in both of these provisions would be considered
content-neutral on their faces because neither distinguishes permissible
impermissible speech by reference to the message being conspeech 14from
1
veyed.

The language relating to disturbing the peace or good order of a ceremony at least allows for an argument that it is content-based. Prohibiting
speech based solely upon the direct impact it has on an audience is generally not a content-neutral restriction. 142 In Boos v. Barry the Court dealt
134.

135.
136.

See 38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(1) (2006).

38 U.S.C. § 2413(b) (2006).
See Andrea Cornwell, Comment, A FinalSalute to Lost Soldiers: Preserving the

Freedom of Speech at Military Funerals,56 AM. U. L. REV. 1329, 1353 (2007).
See 38 U.S.C § 2413(b) (2006).
137.
138.
Patriot Guard Riders Home Page, http://www.patriotguard.org (last visited Feb.
21, 2008). See also Tom Gantert, Kansas Protest Group Threatens to Picket Funeral,
Doesn't Show, ANN ARBOR NEWS, Oct. 31, 2006, at Al (stating that the Patriot Guard Riders
said that they only attend the funerals of veterans if they have been invited).
139.
See 38 U.S.C § 2413(b) (2006).
140.
Id.
141.
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976).
Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988).
142.
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with an anti-picketing ordinance that applied within 500 feet of a foreign
embassy. 43 The ordinance prohibited speech that brought any foreign government into "public disrepute."' 44 In finding the ordinance content-based,
the Court reasoned that the ordinance only prohibited speech that was critical of a foreign government and would not have prohibited certain topics of
speech, such as speech related to a labor dispute with a foreign government. 45 The city tried to argue that the ordinance was not content-based
because it was only aimed at limiting a secondary effect of the speech: offending the dignity of foreign diplomats. 146 In rejecting this argument the
Court said that secondary effects of speech, which may be validly regulated
as content-neutral restrictions, do not include the direct impact of speech on
its audience. 147 The argument that The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes
Act also facially restricts speech based on content would likely be that by
defining the prohibited speech by the language "disturbs or tends to disturb
the peace or good order,"'' 48 the Act only restricts speech based upon the
direct impact it has on an audience. 49 This argument fails because unlike
the ordinance in Boos, enforcement of the Act here does not depend on the
message being conveyed. In Boos, a labor dispute rally would not be prohibited by the ordinance, 50 while such a labor rally would be prohibited by
The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act. To take it one step further,
speech that is supportive of a foreign embassy would not fall under the
scope of the ordinance in Boos,' 5' while even speech that is supportive of
the individual for whom a funeral service is being held would fall under the
scope of The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act unless it is part of
the official funeral service. 52 Additionally, the exact language used by
143.
Id. at 315.
144.
Id.
145.
Id. at 318-19.
146.
Id. at 320.
147.
Id. at 320-21.
148.
38 U.S.C § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
149.
Id. While an argument could be made that these protests implicate the Hostile
Audience Doctrine such an argument would likely fail because the solution to a hostile audience problem is to have more law enforcement present. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S.
315, 321 (1951). This argument is especially weak when an event is planned ahead of time,
such as a funeral, where law enforcement officials are on notice that such an event may
create a hostile crowd. See id. Additionally, there is very little factual support for the contention that these funeral attendees are on the verge of the imminent violent action necessary
to trigger the doctrine.
150.
Boos, 485 U.S. at 318-19.
151.
See id. (reasoning that only speech critical of a foreign embassy would be prohibited under the ordinance).
152.
See 152 CONG. REc. H2199, H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Professor David Forte) (stating that speech does not have to be disruptive to fall under the Act if
the speech occurred within the cemetery).
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Congress here was deemed content-neutral by the Supreme Court in
Grayned v. City of Rockford. 5 3 In Grayned, the Court dealt with a noise
ordinance that restricted speech near schools if the speaker made "any noise
or diversion which disturbs or tends to disturb the peace or good order" of a
school session.154 The Court did not explicitly say that the language was
content-neutral but merely conducted a "reasonable time, place, and manner" analysis and concluded that this language was facially valid. 155 Looking at the Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act on its face, the references to prohibited speech do not depend on the content of the speech and
therefore the Act must be considered content-neutral.
b.

Legislative Purpose

However, there is still the argument that while the language is contentneutral on its face, the clear purpose behind the Act is to prohibit disagreeable speech on the basis of its content. 15 6 More specifically, the argument is
that Congress created this law because it does not agree with the content of
the Westboro Baptist Church's message that God is punishing America
because of its general tolerance of homosexuality and, therefore, the Act
should be deemed a content-based restriction despite the fact that the Act's
language does not reference the content of this disagreeable message on its
face. The underlying proposition here is that legislative intent may be considered to turn an otherwise facially content-neutral restriction into a content-based restriction. 57 However, if the predominate intent behind the
regulation is content-neutral then the Act should be considered contentneutral even if suppression of speech based on its content was a motivating
factor. 58 The Supreme Court has recognized that for free speech cases,
'

153.
408 U.S. 104 (1972).
154.
Id. at 108.
155.
Id. at 121. In Grayned the Court was dealing with an overbreadth and vagueness challenge, yet apparently, the petitioner did not challenge whether the ordinance prohibited speech on the basis of content. See id. at 108.
156.
See, e.g., McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 983-84 (E.D. Ky. 2006);
Yes to Phelps, No to Bush, THE ADVOCATE, July 4, 2006, at 5.

157.
See generally Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating
that the "principal inquiry in determining content neutrality" concerns "whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys"); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 295 (1984) (holding that a
speech restriction is content-neutral so long as it is not "applied because of disagreement
with the message presented"); see also Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the ContentBased/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations,34 MCGEORGE L. REv. 595,
620 (2003) (arguing that while "an actual content-based purpose can corrupt a facially content neutral action, [the Court] almost never labels an action according to this determination").
158.
City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1986).
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"[i]nquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous matter"
and it will be reluctant to "void a statute that is . . constitutional
on its
159
face" based on what a few legislators have said about it.
Even if a court were inclined to find a statute to be content-based despite its facial neutrality on the basis of legislative intent, it would not be
justified in doing so if the predominate purpose behind enacting the statute
is content-neutral.160 Only a cursory reading of the congressional record
related to this Act is required in order to recognize that the predominant
intent behind this legislation is to protect the privacy of funeral attendees
and the sanctity of funeral services as opposed to restricting the content of a
particular message.161 The record clearly states that Congress believes these
protesters have a right to deliver their message' 62 and it is void of any evidence that Congress may have had the devious purpose of suppressing free
speech rights simply because it disagrees with the message the speech conveys. 163 While the restriction may have been motivated in response to the
actions of these protesters, such a motivation does not amount to a contentbased legislative purpose.' 64 To hold otherwise would bring into question
the constitutionality of every anti-picketing statute and free speech restriction, especially those created in response to abortion clinic protests. 65 It
would be an anomaly to say that the legislative response of creating an antipicketing or anti-protesting ordinance is per se content-based if it follows
demonstrations by a particular group. 166 The effect would be that as soon as
there is a recognized need for such an ordinance, any ordinance would have
to withstand strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction on free speech. A
finding that an ordinance is content-neutral, subject to the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny standard, would seemingly only occur if the ordinance
were enacted before the need for it ever arose. In Hill v. Colorado it was
abundantly clear that the statute at issue had been enacted in response to
statewide demonstrations at abortions clinics where protesters opposed to

159.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968).
160.
E.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.
161.
See generally 152 CONG. REc. H2199, H2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Professor David Forte) (reasoning that this legislation is aimed at allowing family
members of deceased soldiers to say goodbye to their loved ones in peace).
162.
152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2204 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statements of Rep.
Reyes).
163.
See 152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2206 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Professor David Forte).
164.
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986).
165.
See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724-25 (2000).
166.
See generally Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724-25 (2000) (arguing that just
because legislation is motivated by those on a particular side of a debate does not make the
legislation viewpoint-based).
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abortion initiated various confrontations. 167 However, in analyzing the purpose behind the statute, the Court said that the statute was not created because of disagreement with the protesters' message, but rather because of
the state's interest in protecting privacy.' 68 This same analysis is applicable
to The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act; just because Congress
acted in response to a particular group's demonstrations does not make
Congress' predominant purpose content-based. 169
A careful consideration of the language and legislative history of The
Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act thus reveals that the Act is both
facially content-neutral and enacted for a predominantly content-neutral
purpose. Consequently, intermediate scrutiny should apply, and the Act
should be deemed constitutional if it is narrowly tailored to advance a significant governmental
interest while leaving open ample alternatives of
170
communication.
B.

SIGNIFICANT GOVERNMENT INTEREST

Since The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act is a contentneutral restriction on free speech in the traditional public forum, the next
step is to apply intermediate scrutiny to determine if this restriction advances a significant governmental interest. This part of the analysis is relatively straightforward because the Act advances several significant governmental interests. Congress has previously stated "[a]ll national and other
veterans' cemeteries under the control of the National Cemetery Administration shall be considered national shrines as a tribute to our gallant
dead.'0' This 1973 statement by Congress codified the significant interest
of ensuring that federal cemeteries are treated as places to show honor and
respect to America's "gallant" dead.' 72 In fact, Congress considers national
cemeteries to be so sacred that anyone who has been convicted of a state or
federal capital offense is statutorily forbidden from being buried in a national cemetery
or from having his or her memory honored in a national
73
cemetery. 1
However, honoring America's gallant dead and respecting the sacred
ground upon which they are laid to rest are not the only significant governmental interests advanced by this Act. One of the most fundamental gov167.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 709 (2000).
168.
Id. at 719-20.
169.
See id.
170.
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 482 (1998).
171.
38 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (2000) (originally enacted in 1973 at the establishment of a
National Cemetery Administration system).
172.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2403(c) (2000).
173.
38 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000 & Supp. 2003).

2008]

SPEECH SHOULDN'T BE "FREE" AT FUNERALS

ernmental interests is to protect the health and safety of its citizens. 174 In
both Hill v. Colorado and Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., the Court
recognized that the interest in protecting health and safety rationally extends to protecting people from psychological trauma. 75 In finding a significant state interest, the Court in both of these cases referenced the patient's psychological trauma due to confrontations with protesters at abortion clinics. 76 The Madsen Court agreed with the lower court's analogy
that the state's interest in protecting residential privacy, as found in
Frisby,177 applied with equal force to protecting the privacy of patients who
are seeking medical care. 178 The reasoning used in Madsen is that patients
who are seeking medical care are often in a precarious psychological state
that is exceptionally vulnerable to attack.1 79 This same reasoning should be
applied to the funeral setting. Funerals are obviously somber events, and
family members who have recently learned of the death of a loved one are
often in an even more precarious psychological state 80 that equally justifies
legislative protection. The federal government has a significant interest in
protecting the mental health of funeral attendees and shielding them from
with being subjected to protester
the psychological trauma associated
8
speech during a funeral ceremony. 1
The government also has a significant interest in shielding funeral attendees from unwanted speech under a captive audience theory. A recent
federal district court opinion analyzing a Kentucky state statute that restricts
protests at funerals concluded that funeral "attendees have an interest in
avoiding unwanted, obtrusive communications which is at least similar to a
person's interest in avoiding such communications inside his home."'' 82 The
district court went on to say, "like medical patients entering a medical facility, funeral attendees are captive."' 83 Funeral attendees fit within the definition of a captive audience because they are left with no reasonable means of
174.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000).
175.
See generally Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000) (reasoning that the
avoidance of patient trauma stemming from confrontations with protesters is a significant
state interest); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994) (arguing that
picketing at a health care facility threatens the patients psychological and physical wellbeing).
176.
See Hill, 530 U.S. at 715; Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
177.
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).
Madsen, 512 U.S. at 768.
178.
179.
Id.
180.
Andrew J. McClurg, Dead Sorrow: A Story About Loss and a New Theory of
Wrongful Death Damages, 85 B.U. L. REv. 1, 9-11 (2005) (stating that after learning of the
violent death of a loved one people are highly susceptible to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder).
McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
181.
182.
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 992.
183.
Id.
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avoiding unwanted speech. 184 Those who attend a funeral arguably do so by
choice, but it would be unreasonable to say that they could avoid this disagreeable speech simply by choosing not to come to the funeral or leaving
in the middle of the service if they found the nearby protesters to be too
offensive. 185 In Madsen, the Court reasoned that women seeking an abortion are held "captive by medical circumstance."' 186 Seeking an abortion is
also a choice, but it would be unreasonable to say that a woman could avoid
offensive speech by simply choosing not to go to an abortion clinic. 187 In
each of these scenarios there is arguably a choice to go to the place where
the speech occurs, but because of the reasonableness aspect of the captive
audience doctrine, the audience is properly categorized as captive. 188 While
the Constitution demands tolerance of disagreeable speech in most settings,
it does not demand tolerance of speech that interferes with a "substantial
privacy interest.., in an intolerable manner."' 89 Since funeral attendees are
properly categorized as a captive audience, the government has a significant
interest in protecting them from unwanted speech. 190
Maintaining cemeteries as places to honor America's gallant dead,
protecting the health and safety of citizens from psychological harm, and
shielding captive audiences from unwanted speech all demonstrate that
Congress has significant interests in placing reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on speech near national cemeteries. As long as the restrictions are narrowly tailored to advance these significant interests while
leaving open ample alternatives for the speech, The Respect for America's
Fallen Heroes Act should be upheld as a valid free speech restriction.
C.

NARROWLY TAILORED

The narrowly tailored aspect of the analysis arguably leaves more
room for debate than the significant interest analysis. In order for a contentneutral time, place, and manner restriction to be narrowly tailored it must
advance the government's significant interests without burdening "substantially more speech than is necessary."' 191 To be narrowly tailored under a
time, place, and manner analysis, the restriction does not need to be the
184.
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 41 (1971).
185.
See Phelps-Roper v. Taft, 523 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
186.
Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994).
187.
See generally, Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 768 (1994)
(reasoning that women seeking an abortion are held captive by medical circumstance and by
definition it would be unreasonable for a person in such a circumstance to avoid the speech
by choosing to avoid the place where the speech occurs).
188.
See id.
189.
Cohen, 403 U.S. at 41.
190.
McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975, 992 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
191.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
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1 92
least restrictive means possible as it does under a strict scrutiny analysis.
Under strict scrutiny, a restriction is not narrowly tailored unless it is the
least restrictive means and burdens no more speech than necessary, while
under intermediate scrutiny, the government must only demonstrate that,
193
absent the restriction, the interests would be less effectively achieved.
While the narrowly-tailored analysis under intermediate scrutiny is clearly a
lower standard than what is required under strict scrutiny, it does not 94give
the government freedom to arbitrarily establish restriction boundaries. 1
So long as the time and distance restrictions in The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act do not burden substantially more speech than necessary to advance the significant interests involved, the Act is narrowly
tailored. 195 Taking all of the government's significant interests together,
they can best be summarized as preserving a grieving family's right to be
left alone during a funeral or memorial service. 96 If the specific restrictions
do not burden substantially more speech than is required to preserve this
interest, the Act must be considered narrowly tailored. 197 The Act's provisions do not violate this standard, in part because they only partially protect
the significant interest. Funeral protesters have repeatedly used sound amplification devices at these funerals 198 and nothing in the Act precludes the
continued use of such devices so long as they are not used both within 150
feet of the entrance to the cemetery and within a sixty minute window before and after the funeral.199 This means that even during the funeral, protesters are permitted to congregate 151 feet away from the entrance to the
cemetery and use their sound amplification devices to effectively interfere
with the solemnity of the funeral service. 200 The Act only attempts to prohibit demonstrations that are the most disruptive to the grieving family's

192.
Id. at 798 n.6. The idea that a time, place, and manner analysis does not require
that the statute be the least restrictive means was starkly criticized by Justice Marshall in his
dissent as being too deferential. Id. at 803-05 (Marshall, J., dissenting). However, there
should be no question as to the current state of the law as the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this lower standard for a statute to be narrowly tailored under intermediate scrutiny.
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 726 n.3 (2000).
193.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798.
194.
See id. at 799 ("Government may not regulate expression in such a manner that
a substantial portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals.").
195.
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
196.
See 152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.
Buyer).
197.
See Ward, 491 U.S. at 799.
198.
Jim Belshaw, Protesters an Insult to Free Speech, ALBUQUERQUE J., Sept. 22,
2006, at B 1.
199.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
200.
Id.
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privacy interest, it does not attempt to uphold the privacy interest absolutely.0
The Act is also narrowly tailored because it only prohibits speech that
will actually interfere with the significant interest. 20 2 Demonstrations are
not prohibited unless they interfere with, or have a tendency to interfere
with, the funeral procession as it enters or exits the cemetery, or with the
ceremony itself. 20 3 For example, in the event that a group of union workers
were to picket their employer's place of business that is located within 300
feet of a national cemetery, their actions would not fall under scope of this
Act unless they were interfering with the ability to enter or exit the cemetery during a sixty-minute window of time before or after the funeral service. 2° If the place of business was located within 150 feet of the entrance
to a national cemetery, the protesters' actions would only be restricted if
they were so loud and distracting that they actually interfered with solemnity of the service during the proscribed time frame.20 5 If either of these
situations occurred, the protesters would not be prohibited from delivering
their message; it may only be that they would be required to temporarily
limit the activity that actually interferes with the procession or ceremony. 2°
Even if the Act did have the effect of placing some restrictions on speech
that does not actually disrupt the funeral procession or ceremony itself, such
more speech than
restrictions would fall short of restricting 20substantially
7
necessary to further the significant interest.
However, even if a reviewing court were to be inclined to follow a
seemingly more restrictive approach, such as the one discussed in Frisby v.
Schultz,20 8 The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act would still be narrowly tailored. In Frisby, the Court stated that a "statute is narrowly tailored
201.
Id.
202.
See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (reasoning that a
statute is not narrowly tailored if a "substantial portion of the burden on speech does not
serve to advance its goals").
203.
38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(B) (2006).
204.
205.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A) (2006).
206.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
207.
See generally Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 729 (2000) (reasoning that while
Colorado's general distance restriction will sometimes have the effect of prohibiting harmless speech, such incidental effects do not condemn the statute to violate the narrowly tailored requirement).
208.
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988). The current standard seems to
allow for a lot of discretion at the trial court level so even though the Supreme Court does
not require a least restrictive means test, a lower court could end up applying something
much closer to a least restrictive means test without actually using that language. See generally McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (holding a state antiprotesting statute not narrowly tailored in part because it eliminated more than the source of
evil it sought to remedy).
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if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of 'the evil' it
seeks to remedy., 20 9 Despite this seemingly restrictive language, the Court
found the ordinance in question to be narrowly tailored to advance the significant interest of eliminating targeted residential picketing. 2 10 The Court
also conceded that even a complete ban on speech is narrowly tailored so
long as the prohibited activity is an "appropriately targeted evil.",2 1' Even if
a court were to require that the restriction target and eliminate no more than
the exact source of evil, The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act
would still meet that standard. In Frisby, the evil the ordinance sought to
eliminate was targeted residential picketing where a protester or protesters
picketed in front of an individual home and directed their message at an
individual family or occupant.2 12 As the lower courts construed the language of the statute, the restriction did not apply to general residential demonstrations but only to targeted picketing. 213 The Court thus had no difficulty in concluding that the restriction eliminated no more speech than the
targeted evil.214
The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act also eliminates no more
than the targeted evil. The main targeted evil this Act seeks to eliminate is
the destruction of a grieving family's right to be left alone while a lost
loved one is honored and buried.21 5 The Act achieves this goal in a narrow
manner. First, it restricts the willful making of any noise or diversion that
"disturbs or tends to disturb" a funeral or memorial service. 21 6 Second, it
restricts actions that impede access to a national cemetery.2 17 The first part
eliminates no more speech than the targeted evil because the relevant portions only apply to willfully created noises or diversions within a narrow
window of time that actually disturb or tend to disturb the funeral or memorial service. 218 For example, there is absolutely no restriction on any activity
that does not disturb or does not tend to disturb the funeral service, even if
made within the time and distance restrictions. 21 9 Arguably, a demonstra209.
Frisby,487 U.S. at 485.
210.
Id. at 488.
211.
Id. at 486.
212.
Id.
213.
Id. at 483.
214.
Id. at 488. Without this narrowed interpretation, the ordinance would not be
narrowly tailored because it would prohibit all residential picketing and would have the
effect of prohibiting substantially more speech than necessary to achieve the valid interest.
Id. at 491 (White, J., concurring).
215.

Buyer).
216.
217.
218.
219.

See 152 CONG. REc. H2199, 2200 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Rep.

38 U.S.C. § 2413 (a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
38 U.S.C. § 2413 (a)(2)(B) (2006).
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
Id.
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tion could take place on, or pass through, the public street that adjoins the
entrance to a national cemetery while a funeral is in process so long as that
demonstration does not disturb or tend to disturb the service. 220 While this
might be an unlikely scenario, it is only unlikely because most demonstrations that occur within such close proximity of a funeral are probably going
to have the logical effect of disturbing the funeral. In other words, the only
reason why an activity would be prohibited is because it falls directly in
line with the exact evil that this Act purports to eliminate.
The Act also eliminates no more speech than the targeted evil because
the relevant portions only apply to actions that actually impede access to or
egress from a cemetery during a narrow window of time prior to and following a ceremony. 22 ' Demonstrations that occur within 300 feet of the
cemetery (but beyond 150 of the entrance to the cemetery) and within the
sixty-minute time restriction would only be prohibited if they actually impede access to or egress from the cemetery.222 This provision is narrowly
tailored toward preventing the targeted evil because if the demonstration
does not actually impede access to the cemetery, then the grieving family's
privacy interest is not affected (at least not to the point that Congress has
deemed substantial enough to protect) and the statute does not apply.223 As
in the first provision, only if the targeted evil of disturbing a family's right
to be left alone is infringed upon will the Act's punitive provisions apply.
Even if a court were to apply the seemingly stringent language from Frisby,
this Act is narrowly tailored.224
D.

LEAVES OPEN AMPLE ALTERNATIVES FOR COMMUNICATION

Applying either the more lenient narrowly-tailored analysis the Supreme Court has adopted in most of its cases, or the stricter narrowlytailored analysis discussed in Frisby,225 both lead to the conclusion that The
Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act is narrowly tailored. However, the
time, place, and manner analysis for a content-neutral restriction also requires that the restriction leave open ample alternatives for communication.226 This requirement raises two potential concerns in this situation.
The first concern is whether there are ample alternatives of communication for protesters who want to gather near a cemetery for purposes unre220.
152 CONG. REc. H2199, H2205-07 (daily ed. May 9, 2006) (statement of Professor David Forte).
221.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006).
222.
Id.
223.
Id.
224.
Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988).
225.
Id.
226.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
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lated to a funeral service, such as a labor dispute protest at a nearby business. In this situation, protesters could potentially be restricted from engaging in certain activities if those activities fall within the distance restrictions
and take place within a sixty-minute window before or after a funeral service.227 If there were only one funeral service at the cemetery on a given
day the alternatives for such a group of protesters to communicate a message are more than ample because the restrictions would usually only apply
for a period of between two and three hours (sixty minutes before the service, the time it takes to conduct the service, and sixty minutes after the
service).22 8 The protesters would have the remainder of the day to conduct
demonstrations free from the Act's punitive provisions. 229 The problem is
more significant if funeral services were lined up all day long, effectively
blocking off certain areas from being used by protesters at any time during
business hours. However, because protesters would only be prohibited from
conducting activities that disturb or tend to disturb the funeral service if
they are within 150 feet of an entrance to the cemetery, ample alternatives
would still exist. 230 The protesters could either move to an area just beyond
150 feet of the entrance, or limit their activities so as not to actually disturb
the funeral, likely by limiting the amount of noise they generate. While the
Act does encompass the use of signs and banners,23 1 the use of such signs
and banners would probably only tend to disturb a funeral if they were directed at the funeral attendees.23 2 The use of banners and signs directed at a
business across the street from a cemetery would probably not tend to disturb the funeral services and would be a viable alternative for demonstrators
protesting at a business so close in proximity to a national cemetery.23 3 The
alternatives are even more ample for protesters beyond 150 feet of a cemetery entrance because their activities would only be restricted if they occur
within 300 feet of a cemetery during the prohibited time frame and actually
impede access to or egress from the cemetery.234 Because the restricted activity in this scenario is so narrow, ample alternatives are virtually selfevident. 235 Additionally, alternative methods of communication such as the
use of the federal mail system, handing out pamphlets door-to-door, making
227.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (2006).
228.
See id.
229.
See id.
230.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
231.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(b)(3) (2006).
232.
In Grayned v. City of Rockford the Supreme Court indicated that the words
"tend to disturb" should be interpreted to mean that an actual disturbance is imminent. 408
U.S. 104,111-12 (1972).
233.
See Grayned,408 U.S. at 111-12.
234.
38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(B) (2006).
235.
See generally Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483 (1998) (reasoning "the limited nature of the prohibition makes it virtually self-evident that ample alternatives remain").
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telephone calls, all previously recognized by the Supreme Court, would
be viable alternatives for protesters in these scenarios.
The second concern relates to protesters whose message is directed at
funeral attendees themselves. Alternative methods of communicating a
message to this audience are slightly less apparent because by sixty minutes
after the completion of the funeral service, when the protesters could resume their activities without any restrictions, 237 the audience would generally have dispersed. However, the mere fact that a restriction tends to limit
the "potential audience" for certain speech "is of no consequence" unless it
can be shown that "the remaining avenues of communication are inadequate., 238 One of the factors the Court seems to look at in determining
whether there are ample alternatives of communication is whether the form
of communication sought to be restricted is of such a unique character as to
render all other forms of communication inherently less adequate.23 9 In
Linmark Assoc's Inc., v. Township of Willingboro the Supreme Court struck
down a local ordinance that banned the posting of "For Sale" signs in front
yards. 240 The Court reasoned that using "For Sale" signs was a particularly
effective means of communicating that a piece of property is for sale and
that the use of newspaper advertisements and the passing out of fliers were
not practical alternatives within that specific real estate market. 241 In the
funeral protest scenario, the form of speech sought to be restricted is not of
any special or unique significance whereby any other form or manner of
speech would be inherently less adequate. This statute regulates protests
and demonstrations, forms of speech that have been common to the public
forum for centuries, 242 not a unique form of communication that has no
viable alternatives. The only issue here is to what extent protesters can effectively reach a specifically targeted audience with traditional public forum type speech. One alternative is for protesters to communicate their
message from just beyond the distance restrictions. For example, beyond
300 feet from a cemetery protesters are free to congregate and display their
signs without any special restrictions, even if those activities tended to interfere with a funeral service or procession.243 Other alternatives include the
use of the mail system, handing out pamphlets door-to-door or placing them
236.
Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484.
237.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2) (2006).
238.
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 802 (1989).
239.
See generally Linmark Assoc's Inc., v. Twp. of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977) (holding that a city ordinance restricting the use of "For Sale" signs did not provide
ample alternatives of communication because leaflets, sound trucks, and demonstrations
were not practical forms of communication to sell real estate in that market).
240.
Linmark, 431 U.S. at 85.
241.
Id. at 93.
242.
Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
243.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(B) (2006).
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on car windshields, and making phone calls; all of which could be used to
convey a message to virtually any targeted audience.2
Regardless of whether protesters are directing their message at funeral
attendees or whether their activities are unrelated to the funeral ceremony,
ample alternatives of communication exists because of the limited applicability of the time and distance restrictions and the lack of any prohibition of
a unique form of communication. The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes
Act is a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that is narrowly
tailored to advance a significant governmental interest while also leaving
open ample alternatives of communication.
IV.

SIMILAR STATE LEGISLATION

While The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act is a significant
step towards protecting the privacy of funeral attendees, it only applies to
national cemeteries or funerals of military members; it does not apply to the
state funerals of nonmilitary target groups and would not have protected the
family of Wyoming student Matthew Shepard.24 5 In order to adequately
protect the privacy rights of grieving families, every state needs to adopt
similar legislation. The legislative history of The Respect for America's
Fallen Heroes Act urges states and local governments to pass similar legislation to ensure protection of funeral attendees' privacy at all cemeteries
across the country. 246 State legislatures have rushed to pass similar legislation, but due to imprecise drafting some of these state laws could end up
being struck down. At least three lawsuits, in Kentucky, Kansas, and Ohio,
have been filed challenging the constitutionality of state legislation aimed at
protecting the privacy of funeral attendees.2 47
Part of the Kentucky statute was struck down as burdening "substantially more speech than is necessary to prevent interferences with a funeral. 248 In McQuery v. Stumbo, Federal District Court Judge Karen Caldwell reasoned that the Kentucky statute was not narrowly tailored because it
prohibited certain actions whether or not they interfered with the funeral
244.
See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1998). While these alternatives require that the speaker find out the identity of the audience members, such information is
generally available in local newspapers, at least with regard to close family members.
245.
See 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1388 (2006).
246.
152 CONG. REc. H3209 (daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statements read by Clerk).
247.
See McQueary v. Stumbo, 453 F. Supp. 2d 975 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Dave McKinney, Did Anti-gay Church Have Rights Violated?: Funeral ProtestLaw Could Face ACLU
Challenge, CHI. SUN TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, at 3.
248.
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 997. The Kentucky statute defined interference
with a funeral as including any time anyone "[c]ongregates, pickets, patrols, demonstrates,
or enters on that portion of a public right-of-way or private property that is within three
hundred (300) feet of an event specified in paragraph (a) of this subsection." Id.
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and whether or not the funeral attendees had authorized such activities. 249
The Kentucky statute did not contain the same "disturbs or tends to disturb"
language found within the federal statute.25 ° Judge Caldwell also expressed
concern over the distance restriction because the 300 foot buffer zone applied to cemeteries during a funeral, funeral homes during a viewing, funeral processions, and funeral or memorial services.2 5' She commented that
the buffer zone would extend to "public sidewalks and streets252
and would
property.,
own
their
on
speech
owners'
property
private
restrict
This Kentucky statute highlights some of the biggest obstacles states
will have in enacting legislation similar to The Respect for America's
Fallen Heroes Act. In order to achieve a similar level of effectiveness, state
restrictions may have to be much broader due to the particular layout of the
actual cemetery.2 53 Additionally, most states will want to extend the protections beyond the cemetery to include funeral services at churches, funeral
homes, and funeral processions.254 Restrictive buffer zones covering these
areas will probably extend to private property, and drafters will have to be
particularly cautious when enacting restrictions that might limit what private landowners can do on their own property. One possible solution might
be to limit the statute's application to public property and specifically exempt private property, but that carries the risk of limiting the statute's effectiveness. Additionally, states should adopt the language from the federal
statute that restricts its applicability to actions that disturb or tend to disturb
the funeral service. Without such a limitation the statute will likely not survive a challenge for the same reasons the Kentucky statute was partially
struck down.25 5
Individual states will face unique challenges in drafting legislation that
adequately protects the privacy interests of funeral attendees while avoiding
constitutional infirmities. Drafters will need to look at proposed legislation
from an adversarial point of view and determine how and where it could be
attacked. Drafters should pay close attention to how their proposed legisla249.
Id. at 996.
250.
38 U.S.C. § 2413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
251.
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
252.
Id. at 996.
253.
The original Respect For America's Fallen Heroes Act as drafted by Congress
restricted activity within 500 feet of a federal cemetery but the Senate amendment altered the
distance restriction in part because it concluded that the unique layout of federal cemeteries
(committal shelters where funeral ceremonies are actually held are a minimum of 300 feet
from the property line) did not necessitate a larger restriction. See 152 CONG. REc. S5129
(daily ed. May 24, 2006) (statement of Mr. Craig). Additionally, trees and shrubs almost
always block the property line so the 500-foot restriction did not add much, if any, protection. Id.
254.
See McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 977.
255.
McQueary, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 996.
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tion will affect speech unrelated to the funeral service or procession and try
to ensure that their legislation only restricts speech that actually interferes
with or imminently will interfere with the privacy interests at stake.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act is a constitutionally
valid restriction on free speech because it is a permissible time, place, and
manner restriction. The Act is both facially content-neutral, in that it does
not define impermissible speech on the basis of content, and it was enacted
for the content-neutral purpose of protecting the privacy interests of grieving families. The Act furthers the significant interests of honoring America's gallant dead, protecting the mental and emotional well being of
American citizens, and securing the privacy interests of a grieving family
during a funeral service. Further, the Act is narrowly tailored because it
only restricts speech that actually interferes with the service or will imminently interfere with the service. The Act is not substantially overbroad and
the government's significant interests would be achieved less effectively
absent the restriction. The Act also leaves open ample alternatives of communication because of its limited time and distance restrictions, and because the type of speech the Act seeks to restrict does not have any special
or unique characteristics that would indicate alternate forms of communication would be inherently inadequate.
As Congress urged, every individual state should pass similar legislation. While states have additional obstacles to overcome in drafting adequate protections, grieving family members need protection from emotional
abuse at funerals. Every family deserves the opportunity to peacefully
mourn the death of a loved one without being subjected to unwanted speech
of any kind. The Constitution should not be used as a weapon to inflict suffering upon family members during a funeral and the Constitution does not
demand tolerance of such inappropriate behavior. It is truly unfortunate that
the need arose to create The Respect for America's Fallen Heroes Act, but
Congress should be applauded for doing the right thing and each state
should follow its lead.
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